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Abstract
With the widespread adoption of cloud services, especially the extensive de-
ployment of plenty of Web applications, it is important and challenging to
detect anomalies from the packet payload. For example, the anomalies in
the packet payload can be expressed as a number of specific strings which
may cause attacks. Although some approaches have achieved remarkable
progress, they are with limited applications since they are dependent on in-
depth expert knowledge, e.g., signatures describing anomalies or communi-
cation protocol at the application level. Moreover, they might fail to detect
the payload anomalies that have long-term dependency relationships. To
overcome these limitations and adaptively detect anomalies from the packet
payload, we propose a deep learning based framework which consists of two
steps. First, a novel feature engineering method is proposed to obtain the
block-based features via block sequence extraction and block embedding. The
block-based features could encapsulate both the high-dimension information
and the underlying sequential information which facilitate the anomaly de-
tection. Second, a neural network is designed to learn the representation of
packet payload based on Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) and Convolu-
tional Neural Networks (CNN). Furthermore, we cast the anomaly detection
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as a classification problem and stack a Multi-Layer Perception (MLP) on the
above representation learning network to detect anomalies. Extensive experi-
mental results on three public datasets indicate that our model could achieve
a higher detection rate, while keeping a lower false positive rate compared
with five state-of-the-art methods.
Keywords:
Packet payload, anomaly detection, block-based features, deep learning.
1. Introduction
The rapid increase of cloud services brings remarkable convenience to
our daily life and promotes the Internet economy. However, it is faced with
abundant threats from malicious attackers. According to the data from the
annual report of Micro Focus [1], there are almost 51% growth of disclosed
vulnerabilities that are related with Web applications in 2017, and nearly
95% of Web applications are vulnerable to sensitive data exposure, which
would cause great harm to the usage of cloud services. Therefore, it is highly
expected to accurately detect anomalies in network traffic. To this end, a va-
riety of methods have been developed, which could be roughly classified into
the following categories, namely, rule-based methods, flow-based methods,
and packet-based methods.
As one typical method of rule-based anomaly detection, Carmen et al. [2]
applied feature selection called Generic-Feature-Selection to construct do-
main specific rules for Web application firewall. By adopting and integrating
these technology [3, 4], a number of powerful tools have been developed for
constructing domain specific rules from known threats, such as Suricata [5]
and Snort [6]. These tools use a highly efficient engine to discover malicious
traffic by comparing the extracted signatures with the predefined rules. If
malicious traffic is detected, actions can be taken to protect the cloud ser-
vices. Although the rules-based methods are effective for the known threats,
they heavily depend on in-depth expert knowledge, e.g., signatures describing
anomalies.
Recently, some machine learning methods have been proposed to detect
traffic anomaly. There are two popular directions, which use flow-based
information and packet-based information to detect anomalies respectively.
Flow-based anomaly detection usually treats the representation of network
traffic as a type of time series [7, 8, 9]. [10] used the five-tuple to construct
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comprehensive behavior profiles of network traffic in terms of communication
patterns of end-hosts and services. The anomalies are detected by exploring
the correlation between the traffic behaviors and the corresponding charac-
teristics. [11] presented a framework called ATLANTIC which uses similari-
ties of flows to detect threats in traffic flows. These methods could achieve a
competitive performance when the flow-based behaviors are presented. How-
ever, they do not perform well for some kinds of attacks, e.g., shell-code and
SQL injection, which do not express abnormal characteristics in flow-based
information.
Packet-based anomaly detection can unveil anomalies by inspecting the
packet payload, which refers to the user data of network packet. The ob-
jective of packet-based anomaly detection is to discover the possible attacks
that have potential abnormal characteristics in the packet payload. The
anomalies might appear as a number of specific strings. For example, as one
of the most common attacks, i.e., SQL injection, which injects anomalous
codes, such as “ ’ or 1=1 - -”, into conditional statements of SQL queries
to make them always be true. To detect this kind of anomalies from packet
payload, a variety of methods have been proposed. The PAYL was proposed
in [12], which used 1-gram frequency distribution of the packet payload as
features to detect network anomalies. McPAD was then proposed in [13],
which developed a modified feature extraction method for accurate anomaly
detection. More recently, deep learning technology is explored for payload
anomaly detection. Several literature [14, 15, 16] investigated by using raw
measurements to detect payload anomalies. These methods use deep learning
technologies to automatically extract features from packet payload. However,
the performance of payload anomaly detection is still undesirable due to the
incomplete representation of features. As shown in Figure 1, there are two
types of packet payload anomalies that have different distributions of anoma-
lous bytes. Unlike the short-term packet payload anomalies whose anomalous
bytes are concentrated, the anomalous bytes for long-term are scattered and
their abnormal characteristics can not be addressed by existing works. Most
of the existing detection methods ignore the long-term dependency relation-
ships among the anomalous bytes.
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Figure 1: Two examples of the packet payload anomalies that have different distributions
of anomalous bytes. For the short-term packet payload anomaly, the potential anomalous
bytes are concentrated and their abnormal characteristics may be obvious, which could
be detected by existing methods. In contrast, for the long-term packet payload anomaly,
the potential anomalous bytes are scattered and their abnormal characteristics may not
be addressed by existing works. Long-term anomalies in packet payload are more difficult
to be detected than short-term ones for the existing methods.
To tackle this, we propose a payload anomaly detection framework, which
consists of two parts. The former part of the proposed framework is a fea-
ture engineering method, which consists of two steps. First, it introduces a
sliding block to construct block sequences from packet payload. Second, the
low-frequency items of block sequences are filtrated by a dictionary and the
high-frequency items are encoded into the low-dimension embedded vectors
by a self-learning block embedding layer. The proposed feature engineering
method constructs the block-based features, which contain both the high-
dimension information and the underlying sequential information to reveal
the characteristics of payload. The latter part of the proposed framework
is a detection model, which has an LSTM and CNN based neural network
for learning both the potential long-term and short-term dependency rela-
tionships among the block-based features and an MLP based classifier to
discover potential attacks. The major contributions of this paper could be
summarized as follows:
• We propose a feature engineering method that constructs block-based
features of the packet payload, which could reveal the long-term de-
pendency relationships among the anomalous bytes in packet payload.
Our feature engineering method are not dependent on in-depth ex-
pert knowledge. To the best of our knowledge, this could be the first
work that explores the long-term dependency relationships among the
anomalous bytes for the payload anomaly detection.
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• We design a detection model that contains an LSTM and CNN based
neural network to learn both the long-term and short-term dependency
relationships in the block-based features and an MLP based classifier
to discover potential attacks in the packet payload.
• We evaluate the proposed framework that integrates the feature engi-
neering method and the detection model by using three public datasets.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the
related work, including the traditional technology and the deep learning
technology for network anomaly detection. Section 3 presents the proposed
framework, which integrates a feature engineering method and a detection
model. In Section 4, we evaluate the proposed framework by using three
public datasets. We conclude the paper in Section 5.
2. Related work
2.1. Network Anomaly Detection
Network anomaly detection is a fundamental task for the quality of service
(QoS) of Internet. A lot of previous work focused on the anomaly detection
of low-level network flows or high-level backbone networks. To detect anoma-
lies through flow-based information, ATLANTIC[11] used deviations in the
entropy of traffic flow tables to detect threats in traffic flows. In [10], K.
Xu et al. detected anomalies by exploring the correlation between traffic be-
haviors and the corresponding characteristics in backbone networks. These
methods could achieve a high detection accuracy for flow-based anomalies,
but it is unlikely to detect attacks that insert anomalies in packet payloads,
e.g., shell-code and SQL injection. Packet-based anomaly detection meth-
ods focus on inspecting the abnormal information in the packet payload. K.
Wang et al. [12] proposed PAYL which uses the 1-gram frequency distribu-
tion of the payload as features to detect anomalies. R. Perdisci et al. [13]
proposed McPAD to construct modified 2-gram features that contain abun-
dant information for accurate anomaly detection. However, the accuracy of
these methods heavily depend on feature construction that is complex and
requires in-depth expert knowledge.
2.2. Deep Learning Methods for Network Anomaly Detection
Deep learning technology, which could automatically learns representa-
tion of data, was recently explored to address the limitations of the tradi-
tional machine learning methods. To detect the flow-based threats in network
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traffic, many studies investigated the power of deep learning for flow-based
anomaly detection. Kim et al.[17] proposed C-LSTM neural network for effec-
tively modeling the spatial and temporal information contained in raw data
to detect anomalies in traffic. Tang et al. [18] proposed a flow-based Deep
Neural Network (DNN) model for intrusion detection in a software defined
networking environment. To detect payload-based attacks, several detection
models using the raw payload data as input have been investigated in the
literature. Gonzalo et al. [14] applied deep CNN and LSTM neural networks
for network intrusion detection with different representations of payload data.
Arne et al.[19] applied LSTM neural networks to learn latent characteristics
of normal requests. H.Liu et al.[20] implemented an end-to-end deep learning
detection models using raw payload data. Wei et al.[21] proposed hierarchi-
cal spatial-temporal features-based intrusion detection system, which applied
deep CNN to learn the low-level spatial features of network traffic and used
LSTM to learn the high-level temporal features. Sheraz N.et al.[22] devel-
oped several neural networks to build network anomaly detection models,
including CNN, auto encoders and recurrent neural networks (RNN).
2.3. Summary
The most related work to our paper is [16], which proposed a RNN model
with the attention mechanism called ATPAD to detect anomalies in the
packet payload. The ATPAD employs the word embedding and RNN to
extract features, which are used at the attention calculation stage to cap-
ture the correlation between potential byte of payload and the detection
results. Different from the ATPAD model, we propose a novel feature engi-
neering method which utilizes the raw packet payload data to construct the
block-based features. The block-based features contain two different kinds of
information that retain both long-term and short-term dependency relation-
ships among the packet payload. We also employs a neural network based on
LSTM and CNN rather than the RNN model with the attention mechanism
to capture the long-term dependency relationships among the anomalous
bytes. To the best of our knowledge, our model achieves state-of-the-art
performance on the CSIC 2010 dataset[23].
3. Proposed framework
The proposed anomaly detection framework is shown in Figure 2. There
are four modules in this framework. The first two modules make up the
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former part of the proposed framework, which aims to construct block-based
features for efficient feature extraction. In the first module, the payload is
extracted and labeled through a preprocessing process. Then, the block se-
quence is constructed by the sliding block and in order to remove redundant
information, the high-frequency items in the block sequence are selected by
a dictionary. In the block embedding process, the block-based features are
constructed by encoding each item in block sequence into an embedded vec-
tor. The last two modules form the latter part of the proposed framework,
which aims to adaptively detect anomalies for packet payload. Specifically,
a neural network based on the LSTM and the CNN is designed to learn
both the long-term and short-term dependency relationships in the block-
based features and an MLP is adopted as a classifier to detect anomalies in
each sample. In order to better understand how the framework works, the
framework is described in details in the following subsections.
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Figure 2: Overview of the proposed framework. The proposed framework contains four
modules. First, the payload is extracted and labeled through a preprocessing process.
Then, the block-based features are constructed for each payload. In the last two modules,
a detection model based on the LSTM, CNN and MLP is designed for packet payload
anomaly detection.
3.1. Packet Payload Preprocessing
The objective of the packet payload preprocessing is to extract the pay-
load from the packet and to convert the payload into a suitable form for the
following feature engineering method. The payload extraction is conducted
by packet parsing based on the low-level communication protocols. The
following process will try to construct efficient expression for the extracted
payload. Thus, instead of employing the encoding method, e.g., popular
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Figure 3: An example for the process of block sequence construction. With a sliding block
of length 3 and a fixed stride, the blocks extracted from a packet payload form a block
sequence.
one-hot encoding, to transform the extracted payload to an embedding vec-
tor with fixed length and possible zero padding, we directly process the whole
payload to a byte stream, which is a string with variable length. The byte
stream and the label with respect to the same packet make up a sample for
the preprocessed packet payload data.
3.2. Block-Based Feature Extraction
Instead of using the payload byte stream as features, we proposed a fea-
ture engineering method to extract the block-based features which contain
the high-dimension information and the underlying sequential information
for anomaly detection. The block-based feature extraction has two steps,
i.e., block sequence construction and block embedding. Firstly, a block se-
quence is constructed by using the sliding block to extract numerous items
that could be considered as short subsequences. For retaining the sequen-
tial information, the items are arranged in order. Secondly, to reduce the
redundant information unrelated to anomalous bytes in block sequences, the
high-frequency items of each block sequence are selected by a dictionary and
encoded into embedded vectors through block embedding process.
The process of block sequence extraction is shown in Figure 3. A sliding
block of specific length slides on each sample consecutively. When the sliding
block slides to a certain position, an item would be extracted, then the sliding
block would move with a fixed stride to extract items repeatedly. Finally, the
block sequence is constructed by arranging blocks in a sequence according to
the order of extraction process.
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As mentioned above, the high-dimension information and underlying se-
quential information are retained in the block sequences, which are not just
useful for detecting general anomalies in the payload, but also efficient for
detecting anomalous bytes that have long-term dependency relationships.
First of all, the high-dimension information could be considered as a kind of
semantic information, which is affected by the length of sliding block. Intu-
itively, the longer the sliding block is, the more high-dimension information
the item contains. As is shown in Figure 4(a)&(b), for the same part of
the packet payload, when the block length equals to 2, the items ka, ae, ef
are extracted by the sliding block. They have more information than sin-
gle character k, a, e, f that are extracted when the block length equals to
1. However, when the length of the sliding block is too long, the extracted
features would contain a mixture of normal information and abnormal in-
formation, which might confuse the learning process for anomaly detection.
Thus, a suitable length of the sliding block should be chosen.
Moreover, as the length of sliding block increases, the block sequence
could contain more abundant sequential relationships. To be specific, under
the ASCII extended 256 standard, there are about 2562n possibilities of the
sequential relationships between items of length n. As is shown in Figure
4(c), when the block length equals to 2, the item ka has 2 different sequential
relationships, i.e., ka−→ae and ka−→ab. When the block length equals to 1,
the item k only contains the sequential relationship k−→a. Furthermore, the
expression of both the short-term and long-term dependency relationships in
the block sequence is enhanced as the block length increases. This will benefit
practical payload anomaly detection, especially for those that have long-term
dependency relationships, such as the Union Query Attack[24].
The high-frequency items in the block sequence would be selected by
a dictionary for the reason that there are plenty of redundant information
unrelated to the anomalous bytes. In the extraction process of the sliding
block, a dictionary is constructed to record the frequency of occurrence for
each item and a threshold is set to limit the number of high-frequency items
in the dictionary. By using the dictionary, each high-frequency item in the
block sequence is selected and rearranged in the original order. Finally,
each sample would be reconstructed into a sequence of selected items, which
represent the significant information of each sample.
Furthermore, the high-frequency items in the block sequence are en-
coded by block embedding layer in order to make a better expression of the
high-dimension information and underlying sequential information. One-
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Figure 4: An example of block sequence construction process and information variations
using different sliding block. Using a sliding block with a fixed stride, the blocks extracted
from payload could be regarded as a set of short strings. Comparing the process of sliding
blocks with different lengths in the same field of the payload, the block with length 2
extracts more abundant sequential relationships than the block with length 1.
hot encoding does not work for this task, because it could not represent
the similarity between different items and with the increase of number of
items, it is faced with the curse of dimensionality. Inspired from distributed
representation[25], the items in each block sequence are encoded into low-
dimension embedded vectors by a self-learning block embedding layer. The
block-based features are constructed by concatenating all the vectors in or-
der.
The proposed feature engineering method builds the block-based features,
which do not rely on in-depth expert knowledge, as several low-dimension
embedded vectors to form a valid expression of packet payload.
3.3. Model Construction and Anomaly Detection
The structure of the proposed anomaly detection model is presented in
Figure 5. A neural network based on LSTM and CNN is designed to learn
the high-dimension information and the underlying sequential information
contained in the block-based features. LSTM is used to learn the sequential
dependency relationships among the block-based features, which are indi-
cated in its hidden states of each time step. In order to learn both the
long-term and the short-term dependency relationships in block-based fea-
tures, we make use of the chosen LSTM hidden states in different time steps
10
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Figure 5: An illustration of our proposed anomaly detection model.
instead of only using the last hidden state that is widely adopted in classi-
fication tasks. CNN based structure is adopted to extract the local spatial
information in the chosen hidden states and an MLP connected with a soft-
max layer is used as a classifier to detect anomalies.
In recent years, LSTM has been applied to machine translation[26], speech
recognition[27], and so on, for its capability of processing persistent informa-
tion. Benefiting from its special memory cell structure and gating mecha-
nism, it solves the exploding and vanishing gradient problems, which enable
the efficient learning for long sequences. Therefore, LSTM is adopted for pur-
pose of learning the long-term dependency relationships in the block-based
features. In the proposed detection model, we employ LSTM to learn the
relationships in the block-based features, i.e., the constructed features of our
feature engineering method. At each time step, an embedded vector v of
block-based features is fed into the LSTM. The LSTM updates its cell state
ct and outputs the current hidden state ht according to the previous hidden
state ht−1 and the current input vt through its inner non-linear operations.
For the output of the LSTM at each time step t, the hidden state ht is
calculated as follows[28]:
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ft = σ (Wf · [ht−1, vt] + bf ) (1)
it = σ (Wi · [ht−1, vt] + bi) (2)
ot = σ (Wo · [ht−1, vt] + bo) (3)
ct = ft ∗ ct−1 + it ∗ tanh (Wc · [ht−1, vt] + bc) (4)
ht = ot ∗ tanh (ct) (5)
Here, the ft, it and ot are the forget, input and output gates respectively.
They control the process for updating the LSTM hidden state. σ is the logis-
tic sigmoid function[29] and the tanh is the hyperbolic tangent function[30].
W is the weight matrix and b is the bias. The notations · and ∗ represent
the Matmul product and the Hadamard product[31] respectively.
Assume that the length of block-based features is n, which varies with
different samples, there will be n hidden states. The last hidden state of
LSTM is widely adopted in classification tasks, however, it could not ade-
quately express the long-term relationships in the block-based features. To
tackle this, we choose m candidates from the n hidden states and these can-
didates are equally spaced in the ascending hidden states. This process not
only preserves the long-term relationships, but also reduces the complexity
of feature expression.
CNN is powerful for its capability to learn spatial features and reduce fea-
ture space. Benefiting from sparse connectivity, shared weights and pooling,
CNN extracts the spatial correlation information via convolution without
any complex processing[32]. The CNN based structure in our model is used
to extract high-level spatial information in the chosen hidden states. The
chosen hidden states are concatenated in order and reshaped into a two-
dimensional matrix. In the convolution layer, multiple convolution filters
slide over the matrix to do the convolution operations, which extract the
local spatial features. The learning process for CNN based structure is pro-
gressive, where the first convolution layer extracts low-level features and the
next convolution layer extracts high-level features. After each convolution
layer, a max-pooling layer is adopted to obtain the largest value of a small
region, which preserves the important parameters and enhances the general-
ization ability of the model. In addition, the rectified liner unit (ReLU)[33]
is used as the activation function to add nonlinear constraint in the process.
After the convolution and pooling, the spatial features of each sample are
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extracted and flattened into a vector which is further transmitted to the
classifier.
By casting the payload-based anomaly detection as a classification prob-
lem, an MLP is stacked on the above neural network to detect anomalies.
The MLP has two layers, which would convert the flattened vector into a two-
dimension vector z, and the softmax function maps it into a two-dimension
distribution s = (s0, s1) by Eq. (6), whose values are scaled between 0 and
1, and the sum of these two values is 1. The sample would be labeled by the
Eq. (7). The label 0 means the classifier judges the sample is normal, while
the label 1 means the classifier judges the sample is anomalous.
s = Softmax(z) (6)
label =
{
0, if s0 < s1
1, else
(7)
3.4. Implementation
In the proposed framework, there are four hyper-parameters needed to
be set up, which includes the length of sliding block, the stride of sliding
block, the number of high-frequency items in the dictionary and the number
of chosen LSTM hidden states. In the experiments, the length of sliding
block, the stride of sliding block, the number of high-frequency items in the
dictionary, and the number of chosen states are set up as 3, 1, 15000, and
50, respectively.
Regarding the parameters of the neural network we have designed, the
hidden units of LSTM are set to 128 and the LSTM is fed with a embedded
vector of 64 dimensions at each time step. Two convolution layers and two
pooling layers are implemented in the CNN based structure. These two
convolution layers have 32 and 64 filters, respectively. All the filters in the
convolution layers are with size of 4×4. Each pooling layer uses max-pooling
with a 2× 2 filter.
An MLP with two layers is used as a classifier, which has 128 and 2 hidden
units respectively. It finally converts the feature maps into a two-dimension
vector for classification. During the training process, we set the learning rate
to 0.0001 for a stable training. The dropout rate for the MLP is 0.1.
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4. Evaluation
In this section, we conduct various experiments to evaluate the perfor-
mance and effectiveness of the proposed framework for the payload anomaly
detection. We first describe the datasets and metrics used for the evalua-
tion. Then, experiments are conducted to evaluate the performance of the
proposed framework on different aspects.
4.1. Datasets
We conduct experiments on three datasets to evaluate the performance
of the proposed method. These three datasets contain various types of net-
work traffic attacks. We randomly divided each dataset into three parts, the
training set, the validation set and the testing set. These three sets account
for 70%, 10% and 20% of the total data in each dataset, respectively. The
overview of three datasets are shown in Table 1 and the detailed description
of each dataset is introduced as follows.
4.1.1. CSIC 2010
The CSIC 2010 dataset[23] is developed at the Information Security In-
stitute of Spanish Research National Council and contains thousands of Web
requests which are generated automatically. The dataset consists of 72,000
normal requests and more than 25,000 anomalous requests, and all HTTP
requests are marked as normal or abnormal. The CSIC 2010 dataset con-
tains various types of Web attacks such as SQL injection, buffer overflow,
information collection and so on.
4.1.2. CICIDS 2017
The CICIDS 2017 dataset[34] contains both normal traffic and up-to-
date attacks which resemble the true data. The dataset is developed by the
Canadian Institute for Cyber Security. Various types of attacks, include DoS,
DDos, heartbleed, web attack, infiltration and botnet, are collected in this
dataset. In the experiments, we only use the traffic data collected in July 6,
which contains three types of Web attacks that are related with the packet
payload including Brute Force, XSS and SQL injection.
4.1.3. ISCX 2012
ISCX 2012 dataset[35] contains network traffic which aims to describe
network behaviors and intrusion patterns. This dataset contains actual traffic
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types such as HTTP, SMTP, SSH, IMAP, POP3, and FTP. It records packet
payloads of traffic traces in the form of PCAP and the relevant profiles are
publicly available for researchers. In our experiments, we use the traffic data
collected in June 17th, which contains Brute Force SSH anomalies related
with the packet payload.
Table 1: The detailed description of three experimental dataset.
Dataset Category Train Validation Test
CSIC 2010
Anomaly 17,617 2,439 5,009
Normal 50,328 7,268 14,404
CICIDS 2017
Anomaly 6,374 951 1,822
Normal 14,188 1,987 4,053
ISCX 2012
Anomaly 1,618 241 482
Normal 33,722 4807 9,616
4.2. Performance Metric
In our experiments, we consider the abnormal packet payload to be a
positive sample and the normal packet payload to be a negative sample. The
methods performed in the experiments are evaluated on five metrics, i.e.,
Precision, Detection Rate (DR), False Positive Rate (FPR), Accuracy and
F1-Score. These metrics are defined based on four related parameters, i.e.,
TP, TN, FP, FN, where TP represents the number of true positive sam-
ples, FN represents the number of false negative samples, FP represents the
number of false positive samples and the TN represents the number of true
negative samples.
The definitions of the five metrics are listed as follows:
Precision =
TP
TP + FP
(8)
DR =
TP
TP + FN
(9)
FPR =
FP
FP + TN
(10)
Accuracy =
TP + TN
TP + FP + FN + TN
(11)
15
F1-score = 2× Precision×DR
Precision +DR
(12)
4.3. Results and Discussion
In this section, we have implemented five experiments to evaluate the
performance of the proposed framework in the following five aspects:
• Experiment A: How is the performance of the proposed framework
compared with the traditional machine learning methods and other
state-of-the-art methods?
• Experiment B: Whether the block-based features are a well expression
of the packet payload characteristics?
• Experiment C: Whether the proposed detection model can extract the
long-term dependency relationships in payload anomalies?
• Experiment D: What is the influence of the hyper-parameters in the
proposed framework?
• Experiment E: How does the proposed model perform on other public
datasets?
4.3.1. Experiment A: Performance compared with other methods
In this experiment, we test the proposed framework on the CSIC 2010
dataset and compare the results with those of other methods. Five com-
pared methods are involved in this experiment. Specifically, we use two
classical machine learning methods and three methods recently released as
the compared methods. We use the scikit-learn library[36] to implement
two traditional machine learning methods, support vector machine(SVM)[37]
and random forest(RF)[38], and test them on CSIC 2010 dataset. The other
three methods include a RNN based method (Qin’18[16]), a CNN based
method (Zhang’17[15]) and a LSTM based method (Bochem’17[19]). In the
experiments, we simplify the http payload by ignoring the request header
fields, which removes redundant information and reduces calculation com-
plexity. The detection results of each method are listed in Figure 6(a)&(b),
respectively.
As shown in Figure 6(a)&(b), the proposed framework and three deep
learning based methods outperform the two classical machine learning based
methods in DR, and the proposed framework achieves the highest DR of
16
(a) Detection Rates
(b) False Positive Rates
Figure 6: The Detection Rates and False Positive Rates of the related works and our
experiment. 17
99.12%. The FPR of our proposed framework is 0.22, which is lower than
those of all the compared methods. To the best of our knowledge, our model
achieves state-of-the-art performance on the CSIC 2010 dataset.
4.3.2. Experiment B: Performance analysis of the block-based features
In this experiment, we compare the performance of three models with
or without the adoption of the block-based features. We aim to investi-
gate whether the block-based feature engineering method can improve the
anomaly detection performance in the investigated models. The first model,
LSTM-CNN based model, uses the proposed network structure described in
Section 3.3. The other two models are constructed by only using the LSTM
network or the CNN network described in Section 3.3. We call them as the
LSTM based model and the CNN based model, respectively. The BL prefix
of a models name indicates the model uses the block-based features, other-
wise the method uses the payload bytes stream. The CSIC 2010 dataset is
used to test each model in this experiment.
Our experiment results are shown in Figure 7(a)&(b). When the block-
based features are not used, the CNN based model achieves DR of 84.35%
and FPR of 3.56%, the LSTM based model achieves DR of 91.5% and FPR
of 4.76%, and the LSTM-CNN based model achieves DR of 96.57% and
FPR of 0.72%. When the block-based features are used, the BL-CNN based
model achieves DR of 98.82% and FPR of 0.15%, the BL-LSTM based model
achieves DR of 99.08% and FPR of 0.44%, and the proposed model achieves
DR of 99.12% and FPR of 0.22%. These results show that when the block-
based features extraction method is applied, the DR of each model increases
14.47%, 7.58%, 2.55% respectively, while the FPR of each model decreases
3.42%, 4.31%, 0.5%, respectively.
The above results demonstrate that the block-based features help these
three models improve their detection performance on CSIC 2010 dataset.
Moreover, the block-based feature extraction method could be easily com-
bined with other anomaly detection methods and has the potential to improve
their performance.
4.3.3. Experiment C: Performance analysis for the long-term dependency re-
lationships in payload anomalies
In this experiment, we design a more challenging anomaly detection task,
compared to the basic task in experiment A, to evaluate the proposed frame-
work. The purpose of this task is to investigate whether the proposed frame-
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(a) Detection Rates
(b) False Positive Rates
Figure 7: Detection Rates and False Positive Rates of three models with or without the
adoption of the block-based features. 19
work has the capability of learning the long-term dependency relationships
for packet payload anomalies.
In order to conduct the above task, we use a random-insertion method
to change the sequential dependency relationships of anomalous bytes in
samples of the CSIC 2010 dataset. In this method, each sample is inserted
with a segment of noise, and the length of noise is 20% of the sample length.
The insertion index is random and the noise is all composed of character
‘0’. On one hand, after the random-insertion preprocessing, the noise is
added into each sample which disrupts the original short-term dependency
relationships of anomalous bytes. On the other hand, the same redundant
information increases the similarity between each sample, which makes it
more difficult to extract effective features and detect anomalies.
We calculate the performance metrics for the BL-CNN based model, the
BL-LSTM model and the proposed framework. All the packet payloads are
preprocessed by the random-insertion method introduced above. The exper-
iment results are shown in Table 2, which indicate that the proposed frame-
work still achieves an excellent detection performance. Compared with the
results on the original CSIC 2010 dataset, the DR of the proposed framework
only decreases 0.08%, while the DR of the BL-CNN based model decreases
3.1% and the BL-LSTM based model decreases 1.6%. The proposed frame-
work shows the ability to extract the long-term dependency relationships
in the packet payload anomalies and still performs well on the task in this
experiment.
Table 2: Comparison for the results of three models in Experiment C.
Models DR FPR Precision F1-score Accuracy
BL-CNN 95.72% 0.22% 99.34% 97.50% 98.73%
BL-LSTM 97.47% 0.45% 98.68% 98.07% 99.02%
BL-LSTM-CNN 98.67% 0.17% 99.52% 99.29% 99.53%
4.3.4. Experiment D: Influence of the hyper-parameters on the proposed frame-
work
In this experiment, we attempt to evaluate the influence of four differ-
ent hyper-parameters on the proposed framework. We evaluate one hyper-
parameter each time and the other hyper-parameters are the same as those
set in Experiment A. The experiment is also performed on the CSIC 2010
dataset. The four parameters that we evaluate include the length of sliding
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block, the stride of sliding block, the number of high-frequency items in dic-
tionary and the number of chosen LSTM hidden state. The length of sliding
block is set to 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, respectively. The block sliding length is set to
1, 2 and 3, respectively. For the evaluation of the number of high frequency
items in dictionary, it is set to 5000, 10000, 15000 and 20000 each time. The
number of chosen LSTM hidden state we tested includes 5, 20, 50 and 100.
The influence of the hyper-parameters on the proposed framework is
shown in Figures 8&9. When the length of sliding block is too small, the
information contained in the block-based features is limited. If it is too large,
both normal and abnormal information might be mixed in the block-based
features, which will cause poor performance. The stride of sliding block af-
fects the amount of information extracted from the packet payload, which
should be set to 1. The number of high-frequency items in dictionary af-
fects the amount of information of block-based features, if the number is to
large, the dictionary will involve too much redundant information. However,
if the number is too small, the dictionary may not contain enough valuable
information. The number of chosen LSTM hidden state affects the amount
of sequential feature information used for the proposed framework. The ex-
periment results indicate the model achieves its best detection performance
when the number of chosen states is 50.
4.3.5. Experiment E: Performance evaluation on other public datasets
In this experiment, we evaluate the performance of the proposed frame-
work on other public datasets. We use the subset of the public dataset for
evaluation, which contains attacks related with the packet payload. For the
CICIDS 2017 dataset, we use the Web attack data includes Brute Force,
(a) (b)
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Figure 8: The influence of model parameters on DR.
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 9: The influence of model parameters on FPR.
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XSS, SQL injection in one days record to set up the attack dataset, and use
the normal HTTP traffic data in that day to conduct the normal dataset.
For the ISCX 2012 dataset, we only use the Brute Force SSH attack data to
form the attack dataset. The normal packet payload of SSH data in that day
is used to form the normal dataset.
The detection results on the two datasets are shown in Table 3. Our
proposed method achieves excellent performance on both two datasets. On
the CICIDS 2017 dataset, our proposed model achieves a DR of 99.78% and
an FPR of 0.0165%. On the other dataset, our proposed model achieves a
DR of 99.17% and an FPR of 0.332%.
Table 3: Experimental results of proposed model on other datasets.
Datasets DR FPR Precision F1-score Accuracy
CICIDS 2017 99.78% 0.0165% 99.34% 99.56% 99.92%
ISCX 2012 99.17% 0.332% 98.68% 98.92% 99.64%
5. Conclusion
This paper proposed a payload-based anomaly detection framework to
construct block-based features for efficient feature extraction and to adap-
tively detect anomalies. The block-based features are constructed by the for-
mer part of the proposed framework, which is a feature engineering method
implemented via block sequence extraction and block embedding. The latter
part of the proposed framework, i.e., the anomaly detection model, is de-
signed to learn both the long-term and short-term dependency relationships
in the block-based features and to discover potential attacks in the packet
payload. Experiment results with three public datasets showed that the pro-
posed framework could achieve a high detection rate and a low false positive
rate compared with existing methods in the literature. In future work, we will
consider other kinds of anomalies, e.g., anomalies in video surveillance[39],
and try to explore a unified framework to detect them.
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